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Introduction 
 
Many infrastructure and necessity systems such as electricity and telecommunication in 
Europe and the Northern America were used to be operated as monopolies, if not state-owned.  
However, they have now been disintegrated into a group of smaller companies managed by 
different stakeholders.  Railways are no exceptions.  Since the early 1980s, there have been 
reforms in the shape of restructuring of the national railways in different parts of the world.  
Continuous refinements are still conducted to allow better utilisation of railway resources and 
quality of service.    
 
There has been a growing interest for the industry to understand the impacts of these reforms 
on the operation efficiency and constraints.  A number of post-evaluations have been 
conducted by analysing the performance of the stakeholders on their profits (Crompton and 
Jupe 2003), quality of train service (Shaw 2001) and engineering operations (Watson 2001).  
Results from these studies are valuable for future improvement in the system, followed by a 
new cycle of post-evaluations.  However, direct implementation of these changes is often 
costly and the consequences take a long period of time (e.g. years) to surface. 
 
With the advance of fast computing technologies, computer simulation is a cost-effective 
means to evaluate a hypothetical change in a system prior to actual implementation.  For 
example, simulation suites have been developed to study a variety of traffic control strategies 
according to sophisticated models of train dynamics, traction and power systems (Goodman, 
Siu and Ho 1998, Ho and Yeung 2001).  Unfortunately, under the restructured railway 
environment, it is by no means easy to model the complex behaviour of the stakeholders and 
the interactions between them. 
 
Multi-agent system (MAS) is a recently developed modelling technique which may be useful 
in assisting the railway industry to conduct simulations on the restructured railway system.  
In MAS, a real-world entity is modelled as a software agent that is autonomous, reactive to 
changes, able to initiate proactive actions and social communicative acts.  It has been applied 
in the areas of supply-chain management processes (García-Flores, Wang and Goltz 2000, 
Jennings et al. 2000a, b) and e-commerce activities (Au, Ngai and Parameswaran 2003, Liu 
and You 2003), in which the objectives and behaviour of the buyers and sellers are captured 
by software agents.  It is therefore beneficial to investigate the suitability or feasibility of 
applying agent modelling in railways and the extent to which it might help in developing 
better resource management strategies. 
 
This paper sets out to examine the benefits of using MAS to model the resource management 
process in railways.  Section 2 first describes the business environment after the railway 
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reforms.  Then the problems emerge from the restructuring process are identified in section 3.  
Section 4 describes the realisation of a MAS for railway resource management under the 
restructured scheme and the feasible studies expected from the model. 
 
 
Types of restructuring 
 
Table 1 summarises the years in which five countries began to restructure their national 
railways.  Although the details of the reform differ from country to country, certain 
similarities can still be identified.  In particular, the UK reformation adopted both vertical 
and horizontal separations, either or both of which were also conducted in other countries.  
As a consequence, the UK system will be quoted below to indicate the general approach 
adopted in restructuring. 
 
The UK restructuring process is more commonly known as privatisation since the process is 
accompanied with a change of ownership from the government body to the private sector.  
Prior to the reform, the national system was operated by the British Rail (BR).  Under the 
management of BR, passenger and freight train operations were sub-divided into sectors, and 
each piece of infrastructure in a region was managed by the ‘prime user’ amongst one of these 
sectors (ECMT 2001). 
 
The need of privatisation was derived from the continuous loss of market share to road traffic.  
In 1952, the ratio of freight moved by rail and road was approximately 1:1 while this figure 
dropped dramatically to 1:9 prior to the privatisation in 1994 (DETR 1998).  The main 
reason was generally considered to be over-regulation, which had resulted in poor adaptation 
to market expectation through the rigid pricing structure and poor quality of service. 
 
 
Table 1 Major railways restructuring  
 
Year Country   Principle Legislation 
1980 
1987 
1993 
1994 
1995 
 
USA 
Japan 
China  
UK  
Australia  
 
Staggers Act  
Railway Enterprise Law 
Railway Act 1992 
Railways Act 1993  
National Competition Policy 
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Owing to the success of privatisations in other national businesses such as electricity, gas and 
telecommunications (Crompton and Jupe 2003), the British government decided to extend the 
process to BR so as to allow competition in the railway market.  Competition was expected 
to be an effective means to reduce expenditure and increase revenue (Jensen 1998).  The 
stakeholders now experience pressure from the railway market in which the customers are 
allowed to choose amongst the service providers.  As a result, the stakeholders will attempt 
to eliminate any unnecessary expenses to improve their operating efficiencies.  To maintain 
their sales of service, they are also pressed to improve the quality of service. 
 
Similar to the reformations in other countries, competition in UK was introduced by vertical 
and horizontal separations.  Vertical separation refers to the allocation of responsibilities to 
different stakeholders along the supply chain.  For example, the infrastructure provision is 
separated from train service provision.  Within each category of stakeholders (e.g. train 
service provision), horizontal separation sub-divides the operations into different types (e.g. 
freight, passenger, intercity, and regional services) and distributes the ownerships amongst 
different stakeholders. 
 
Vertical separation in BR resulted in infrastructure provision, infrastructure maintenance, train 
service provision and rolling-stock provision.  With the exception of infrastructure provision, 
horizontal separation was applied to all categories.  The current railway structure in UK 
consists of one infrastructure provider (IP), 25 passengers train operating companies (TOCs), 
2 freight operating companies (FOCs), 13 infrastructure maintenance and renewal companies 
(INFRACOs) and 3 rolling-stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) (Crompton and Jupe 2003).  
The business relationships between these companies are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Structure of the British rail systems after privatisation 
IP 
TOCs 
ROSCOs 
Passenger customers 
Lease 
Payments 
Track Access 
Charge 
FOCs 
INFRACOs 
Maintenance 
Charge 
Freight customers 
Train fares 
Train fares 
Modelling issues on the railway resource management process using MAS 4
Problems associated with restructuring 
 
Despite the intention to resolve the inefficiencies in the monopoly system, the restructuring 
process generated new problems with respect to management operations, engineering 
operations and regulations.  Moreover, if the activities are to be modelled and implemented 
in computer simulations, additional challenges inevitably arise. 
 
 
Management issues 
 
A number of stakeholders are created in the restructuring process.  Through vertical 
separation, none of them possess all the necessary resources to provide train services.  As a 
result, stakeholders need to interact with, and request resources from other parties.  The 
interaction takes the form of negotiation.  When resource is required, the stakeholder 
(initiator) will begin a conversation with the relevant stakeholder(s) (resource managers), 
querying about the charge of utilising the resource.   
 
The resource managers may then reply according to the resource availability and cost.  If the 
price exceeds the acceptable limit of the initiator, a counter-offer is then proposed.  In fact, 
owing to the pressure of competition, all stakeholders are likely to minimise their operating 
cost individually, and efforts are needed to resolve disputes over the pricing of resources.  
 
In other words, the resource management problem is now distributed amongst the 
stakeholders, each of which attempts to conduct local optimisation.  Prior to the reforms, 
resources are allocated centrally by optimising the benefits of the entire corporation.  
However, in a restructured railway, the optimisation process is now distributed amongst the 
self-interested stakeholders.  A solution that is optimal to one stakeholder may not be 
necessarily optimal to the others.  Negotiation is a process through which the stakeholders 
settle at a feasible arrangement.  To allow efficient allocation of resources, it is therefore 
important to evaluate the negotiation strategies for the parties involved.  
 
 
Engineering issues 
 
During the negotiation on resource utilisation charge, it is also necessary to consider the 
engineering constraints in order to avoid incompatibility and in the worst cases, collisions or 
derailments.  For examples, between the negotiation of an infrastructure provider and a 
service operator, attributes such as axle load and line speeds have to be checked before an 
agreement is made (ATRC 2002, SRA 2003).  When railways were operated as corporations, 
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engineering incompatibilities on rolling stocks, speed limits, traction equipment, and 
signalling systems were easily detected because of the complete knowledge of their inventory.  
On the other hand, in the reformed environment, an infrastructure provider has to form 
contractual agreements with the service providers to ensure these engineering requirements 
are satisfied.  It is vital that the negotiating parties have no misunderstanding of the terms 
and conditions in the agreements. 
 
Train scheduling is also a challenging task as it depends heavily on the demand from different 
types of train services (Gibson, Cooper and Ball 2002).  For instance, in an attempt to 
schedule a freight train in a system dominated by passenger services, the capacity utilisation 
is very likely to be degraded because the slower freight trains often cause delays to the faster 
passenger trains.  On the other hand, when freight service dominates the demand, it is 
difficult to devise a schedule that efficiently utilises the track capacity due to the ad-hoc 
service requirement.  Although the scheduling process may be simplified by an administered 
mechanism (Gibson 2003) in which the priority on right-of-way is allocated according to a set 
of predefined rules, flexibility is largely jeopardised and efficient use of track capacity is not 
guaranteed.  It is thus beneficial to develop a train schedule that can compromise the 
fluctuating demands of different types of train services while maximising network capacity. 
 
These engineering issues introduce further complications to the optimisation process.  Firstly, 
in addition to the access charge, there are more attributes to be negotiated, such as the type of 
rolling-stock, arrival and departure times of trains.  Secondly, the existence of engineering 
constraints implies less flexibility in selecting an optimal solution.  Furthermore, these 
constraints may vary according to the commitment of the stakeholders due to the fluctuation 
in demand.  The resultant problem is therefore a multi-attribute, constrained optimisation 
problem which is both distributed and dynamic. 
 
 
Regulatory issues 
 
The intention of regulation after the reforms focuses mainly on encouraging the full utilisation 
of railway capacity, and the maintenance and development of the network.  Although 
regulations on the pricing structure are still present, they are in general more flexible and they 
attempt to cause minimal interference to the competitive market. 
 
For instance, there are now two categories of regulations in UK (ORR 1999).  The first one 
is compulsory, where violations of these regulations will lead to termination of the operating 
licences.  These regulations often form the basic disciplines of the operators (e.g. no 
collusion between operators and a minimum requirement on maintenance investment).  The 
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other type of regulations relates to some incentive targets (e.g. additional subsidies if the 
railway capacity can be increased), where failing to achieve these targets will not lead to the 
termination of licences, but if they are attained, rewards will be given to the operator.   
 
These regulatory constraints provide incentives to improve the overall utilisation of resource, 
rather than allowing the stakeholders to optimise strictly with respect to their commercial 
objectives.  However, it is often difficult to identify the impacts of these regulations since the 
effects may not appear immediately.  Also, the constraints imposed on one stakeholder (e.g. 
train service provider) may transverse through the chain of interactions to other stakeholders 
(e.g. infrastructure maintenance companies), and these indirect effects are not easy to identify.  
 
 
Modelling issues 
 
The resource allocation problem generated from the restructuring process is clearly complex.  
Nevertheless, it will be beneficial if a model can be devised to study the effects of adopting 
different strategies on the management, engineering and regulatory issues. 
 
A model is a representation of the behaviour of a system.  If a model can be implemented in 
a computer executable form, it will be a cost-effective means to study the effects from a given 
set of input stimuli (Ghosh 1999).  In other words, if a suitable simulation model can be 
devised for the restructured railway system, it will be useful to study a variety of ‘what-if’ 
scenarios arising from hypothetical regulations, marketing strategies and train scheduling 
mechanisms.  By comparing the results obtained from these simulations, valuable 
information can be obtained to improve the operations in the system.  
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to model the behaviour of the restructured system by the 
conventional techniques such as the centralised decision-making models (Carey 1994, 
Goodman, Siu and Ho 1998, Ho and Yeung 2001).  In fact, a suitable model for the 
restructured railway system should ensure an adequate representation of the distributive 
nature, negotiation and rational behaviours amongst the stakeholders. 
 
Distributive entities:  As a result of the disintegration of the railway systems, the model 
should be capable of representing the stakeholders as separated entities.  In addition, each of 
them should possess independent control over their decision-making mechanism, actions and 
information.  The restructured system therefore requires a model that is distributive, and 
each entity in the model should be self-interested to ensure the benefit-seeking behaviour of 
each stakeholder is captured.  
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Negotiation:  The model is also required to allow the entities to negotiate for attributes 
associated with the resource, such as price and schedule.  The negotiation should provide a 
means to resolve conflicts arising from dispute over price and engineering constraints.  In 
addition, the model must capture the bilateral (one-to-one) and/or multi-lateral (one-to-many) 
negotiations between the stakeholders, in order to simulate the supply-chain management and 
competition requirements.  Moreover, whenever a deal is made between the entities, the 
negotiation strategy should preferably result in a Pareto-optimal solution.  This means that 
any deviations from this solution results in worse payoffs for at least one entity (Ehtamo, 
Verkama and Hamalainen 1996). 
 
Rationality:  The entities need to make rational decisions and take appropriate actions 
according to the set of management and engineering objectives assigned to them.  These 
entities are equipped with sufficient intelligence to handle the interactions without human 
interferences.  They are also required to be responsive to the dynamic changes in the supply 
and demand in the system, and they should be able to initiate beneficial activities (e.g. 
promoting idle resources) to improve the competitiveness of the entities. 
 
 
Multi-agent systems 
 
A multi-agent system (MAS) is a group of interacting software agents, capable of acting 
autonomously through communicative acts.  Each agent is a representative to a real-world 
entity (Wooldridge 2002).  Agents are generally considered to be self-interested and they 
only have partial control of the environment.  In other words, the actions derived by an agent 
might not always achieve its objectives, and it needs to be reactive and proactive to adapt to 
the environment.  Reactivity refers to the ability to perceive changes in the environment and 
respond to them accordingly, while proactivity refers to the ability to exhibit goal-directed 
behaviour by initiating actions to achieve its designed objectives.  In addition, agents should 
have the ability to interact with each other whenever it is beneficial. 
 
MAS modelling emerged in the 1980s and it is a comparatively new modelling approach.   
Applications using MAS include e-commerce (Au, Ngai and Parameswaran 2003, Liu and 
You 2003), business process management (García-Flores et al. 2000, Jennings et al. 2000a, b) 
and engineering control systems (Jennings and Bussmann 2003).  In railway engineering, a 
prototype MAS to dispatch freight trains on a single railway line was developed in Italy 
(Cuppari et al. 1999).  Later, the MAS technology was applied on optimising the train 
coupling and sharing system (Böcker, Lind and Zirkler 2001).  In these applications, MAS 
allowed the complex systems to be organised in as a community of well-defined entities.  In 
addition, it permits agents to exhibit intelligent behaviours such as reactivity, proactivity and 
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social capabilities through the modelling of classical or AI techniques (Krishna and Ramesh 
1998a, b, Faratin et al. 2002, Luo et al. 2003) 
 
The development of MAS often requires careful design and implementation.  Two of the 
major problems associated with MAS design are the decisions on the size of the agent 
community and the models of agents’ intelligence (Wooldridge and Jennings 1999).  As an 
example for the former, a system could have only one layer of agents to represent the 
companies in a supply-chain, while it is also possible to expand two more layers for the 
departments in the companies and the staff in the departments.  The three-layered approach 
clearly requires a higher demand in modelling the autonomy and interactions of the agents, 
but more detailed studies can be performed at the department level and the personnel level.  
The granularity of the agent society thus depends on the depth of study required.  For the 
latter, it is easy for the designers to overlook the existence of simpler and more efficient 
classical techniques and implement AI models directly.  In fact, the choice of models for the 
rational activities in an agent is highly application-specific.  Despite the increasing 
applications using MAS, there are no standardised techniques in constructing an agent system.  
In other words, thorough studies are needed to verify the performance of the MAS for a 
specific application.  
 
 
Realisation of MAS in restructured railway 
 
A realisation of MAS for railway resource management is illustrated in Figure 2.  Only one 
level of agents is implemented to allow studies of the interactions between the stakeholders.  
It is assumed that the departments and personnel within a stakeholder company share the 
common goals.  Using this architecture of MAS, it is worth examining the feasible studies 
allowed to help the railway stakeholders to manage their resources efficiently.   
 
Distributed autonomy:  In this architecture, the infrastructure provider, train service 
operators and the supporting utilities are represented by different agents.  Since agents are 
autonomous, they are self-contained entities, each of which encapsulates the assigned 
confidential information such as cost curves and operational tactics.  Other agents in the 
community only perceive the agent as a resource provider or a purchaser.  In addition, these 
agents are not expected to share a common goal, but they may form temporal association to 
examine whether a sale of resource is feasible and beneficial.  This agent community can be 
used to study the effects from different degrees of competition by changing the number of 
resource providers and/or purchasers. 
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Figure 2 MAS for the restructure railways 
 
Communication capabilities:  Agents can be programmed to negotiate with other agents and 
form contractual agreements according to the assigned criteria of the stakeholders.  In order 
for an agent to recognise the existence of other agents and resources that they provide, a 
communication platform with a directory service is needed.  Two or more agents should be 
allowed to participate in the negotiation process.  Studies should aims for identifying the 
Pareto-optimal solution.  Currently in the agent literature, the available negotiation 
mechanisms are based on fuzzy logics (Luo et al. 2003) and probability theory (Krishna and 
Ramesh 1998a, b).  Owing to the application-specific nature of MAS modelling, direct 
incorporation of these strategies may not be applicable.  It is however desirable to study how 
they could be extended in the restructured railways. 
 
Rationality:  Further studies will also be performed to evaluate the impacts from any 
hypothetical changes in regulations, business objectives and engineering operations by 
modifying the rational behaviour of the agents.  For instance, constraints as a result from 
regulatory changes can be added locally to the relevant agents, and modification on business 
objectives and scheduling mechanism may be achieved by adjusting the internal cost 
functions and implementing a proper model respectively.  Results from these simulations 
will be used to improve the capacity utilisation or the competitiveness of the stakeholders.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have described the effects of vertical and horizontal separations in railways.  The process 
resulted in a community of stakeholders who compete for providing and acquiring for railway 
resources.  The behaviour of the stakeholders in such a competitive market becomes a 
distributed, multi-attribute, constrained and dynamic optimisation problem. 
Communication Platform 
Directory 
Service 
Railway 
stakeholders 
Software 
agents 
Agent 1 
Negotiation
Assignments of constraints 
and business objectives 
Agent 2 Agent n Agent 3
ROSCO A IPTOC A TOC B
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MAS modelling is a natural means to capture the distributed nature of the system.  Each 
stakeholder in the system can be represented by a software agent.  These agents seek for 
solutions according to the assigned criteria and dynamic situation of the environment.  
Extensive studies can be undertaken to investigate the effects of various degrees of 
competitions and hypothetical changes on regulations, business objectives, and engineering 
constraints. 
 
This paper forms part of broader research on formulating a MAS model on railway resource 
management under the restructured environment.  It is expected the major difficulty during 
the development is the identification of suitable models for representing the intelligence of the 
agents.  Additional studies are therefore required to verify the efficiency of an agent based 
on a particular model.  However, while the ultimate direction of research is to develop a 
complete MAS system, the short-term research should focus on creating the platform for 
negotiation, and examining the suitability of the current agent negotiation mechanisms for the 
existing railways.  It is also the intention of this paper to encourage and enhance the 
recognition of the potential advantages of MAS applications in railway engineering. 
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